When processing a request with a URL path starting with /status or /sysinfo, WOSHttpStatusModule.dll is to be loaded to handle such URL patterns. The WOSBin_LoadHttpModule function in the dll would be called to set up a "module" object for that module. However, WOSHttpStatusModule.dll is not present
Function calls to WOSCommonUtil.dll!WOSSysInfoGetDeviceInterface() in various DLLs (i.e., WOSProfileMgrModule.dll, WOSWebDavModule.dll) can return a NULL pointer (i.e., when no user is logged into the Triofox Server Agent Management Console). The returned NULL pointer is not checked before being de
Gladinet Triofox Cloud Server Agent Access Service (GladServerAgentService.exe) listens on TCP port 7878 and processes remote HTTP messages with URL paths starting with /resources, /status, /sysinfo, /woshome, /Settings, /schedule, or /DavCache.
Gladinet CentreStack and Triofox prior to version 16.12.10420.56791 used hardcoded values for their implementation of the AES cryptoscheme. This degrades security for public exposed endpoints that may make use of it and may offer arbitrary local file inclusion when provided a specially crafted reque
In the default installation and configuration of Gladinet CentreStack and TrioFox, there is an unauthenticated Local File Inclusion Flaw that allows unintended disclosure of system files. Exploitation of this vulnerability has been observed in the wild.
This issue impacts Gladinet CentreStack and
Gladinet CentreStack through 16.1.10296.56315 (fixed in 16.4.10315.56368) has a deserialization vulnerability due to the CentreStack portal's hardcoded machineKey use, as exploited in the wild in March 2025. This enables threat actors (who know the machineKey) to serialize a payload for server-side